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Article 7

NOTES
CoNsmuIONAL LAw - DuE PRoCESS- OF LAw IN STATE
DISBARMeNT PROCEEDINGS

Introduction
Throughout the history, of our legal system, the courts have possessed inherent and summary jurisdiction over members of the bar.- Included in this
jurisdiction is the power to summarily discipline an attorney by disbarment. Two
recent cases serve to emphasize the problems of due "process involved in these
proceedings.
In Cohen v. Hurley2 the accused attorney, relying on his state privilege against
self-incrimination, refused to answer material questions relating to his alleged professional misconduct. The issue arose in the context of an "ambulance chasing"
inquiry by the court. Affirming the New York Court's order of disbarment, the
Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment did not prevent the state
from disbarring an attorney for his refusal to answer questions as to the propriety
of his professional conduct. This result was reached even though the attorney's
refusal rested upon a valid claim of a privilege against self-incrimination. In the
opinion, the majority implicitly approved of the summary procedures used in
the disbarment area. However, the language of the dissenting opinion makes it
apparent that the fairness of these procedures is an extremely difficult and close
legal question.3
The Suprerme Court of Pennsylvania in In re Schlesinger4 took a dimmer
view of summary disbarment procedures. Schlesinger, the accused, was charged
with violating his oath as an attorney by being a member of the Communist Party.
According to statute, the Committee on Offenses of the Court of Common Pleas
appointed a Subcommittee of three of its own members to hear argument on the
motion to dismiss the complaint and to make a report to the Committee. After a
hearing that spanned several years the Subcommittee recommended that Schlesinger
be disbarred. The court adopted the recommendation and entered an order disbarring Schlesinger. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the state the order of
disbarment was reversed and the case remanded with directions to dismiss the
complaint. The court held that the proceeding violated the requirements of "due
process in that the respondent was not afforded the full, fair and impartial hearing to which he was entitled."5 The hearing was deemed defective because "The
functions of prosecutor, judge and jury were combined in one body, namely, the
Committee on Offenses. ... 6 That Committee filed the complaint, prosecuted
the defendant, and through its Subcommittee, adjudicated the charge of unprofessional conduct. The Court of Common Pleas, without any hearing of witnesses,
entered the final order of disbarment. Because this procedure provided no protection against biased conduct, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered it a
violation of a basic due process requirement - namely, a fair trial in a fair
tribunal.
The language of the majority in Schlesinger is parallel to the dissent in Cohen,
in that both opinions cast a disapproving eye on the utilization of summary disbarment procedures. An example of this disapproval is seen in Schlesinger where
the court, contrary to the traditional view that disbarment actions are not criminal
and are not for the purpose of punishment,7 stated that, "A disbarment proceeding is every bit as serious as a criminal trial and often far more so. ...."8
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Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 274 (1882).
'Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
Id., Black, Douglas, Brennan and Warren dissenting.
In re Schlesinger, 172 A.2d 835, 840 (Pa. 1961).
Id. at 840.
Ibid.
Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 274 (1882).
In re Schlesinger, 172 A.2d 835, 848 (Pa. 1961).
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The. objective of this note is to ascertain, as far as- possible, the constitutional
limitations imposed by due process of law upon the procedures used in disbarment
actions.
Historical Analysis of Disbarment Proceedings
It is commonplace for preser*t-day courts to justify their powers of discipline
over attorneys by referring back to the practices of the early English courts. For
centuries, English and American courts have exerted disciplinary powers over
members of the bar. This power has been deemed an incident of the courts' "broader
responsibility for keeping the administratiQn of justice and the standards of professional conduct unsullied." 9
An early Massachusetts tribunal made the following observation concerning
the history of disbarment cases:
[Aft common law an attorney was always liable to be dealt with in a
-summary way for any ill practice attended with fraud or corruption, and
committed against the obvious rules of justice and honesty. No complaint,
indictment or0 information was ever necessary as the foundation of such
proceedings2

As we have seen in Cohen and Schlesinger, an argument can be made that
some aspects of the summary procedures used in this area are contrary to the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. It seems of utmost importance to
note that a similar provision for due process of law existed in English jurisprudence
from at least the year 1215, and that despite this principle, summary disbarment
procedures flourished." In 1215, King John, in the face of baronial resistance and
demands, agreed to and executed Magna Carta. 2 The document provided in
part that:
No free-man shall be seized, or imprisoned, or dispossessed, or outlawed, or
in any way destroyed; nor will we condemn him, nor will we commit him

to prison, 3excepting by the legal judgment of his peers, or by the laws of

the land.'
Commenting on these exact words of the Great Charter, an eminent English

historian wrote that,
This did not guarantee trial by jury, as is so often asserted, because trial

by jury did not become the common procedure in criminal cases until the
reign of Henry III; but it did provide that a freeman should not be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without judgment by his social equals,
obtained by the mode of trial customarily employed to determine innocence
or guilt in the kind of case in question. The clause has almost the same
value as the clause in the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States which forbids that any person "be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."'4

Two interesting and contrary interpretations of the relevant historical material presented themselves in Cohen. The interpretation given by the majority of
the Court, i.e., that -historical precedent prevails in this area, appears to be the
view taken by most American courts. The Cohen majority stated that,
Of course it is not alone the early beginning of the practice of judicial
inquiry into attorney practices which is significant . .. rather it is the long
life of that mode of procedure which bears upon that issue, in much the
same way that a strong consensus of views in the States is relevant to a
finding of fundamental unfairness. What is significant is that the practice
we are now concerned with has survived the centuries which have seen
the fall of all those iniquitous standards of which we are reminded, and
which, incidentally, would be equally unconstitutional today if applied
after a full criminal-type investigation and trial.15
9
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Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1961).
Samuel H. Randall, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 473, 479 (1865).
People v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487, 490 (1928).
DowLiNG, CASES ON 'CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 26 (5th ed. 1954).
Id. at 27.
LUNT, HISTORY OiF ENGLAND 138 (4th ed. 1928)
(Emphasis added).
Cohenv. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
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The long life of the precedents involved failed to impress the dissenters in
Cohen who argued that such precedents were unreasonable and therefore should
be overturned. In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Black made the following
observation,
When the Founders of this Nation drew up our Constitution, they were
uneasily aware of this English practice...
Unlike the majority today, however, the Founders were singularly
unimpressed by the long history of such English practices. They drew up
a Constitution with provisions that were intended to preclude for all time
in this country the practice of making "short
shrift" of anyone - whether
he be lawyer, doctor, plumber or thief.16

Modern Disbarment Procedures
In the case of In re Isserman1? the Supreme Court reaffirmed the historical
competence of the courts in this field. In Isserman it was noted that "there is a
right in the Court to protect itself, and hence society, as an instrument of justice."s
This disciplinary power of the courts is well established in our legal system. 9
The rationale of this power seems to be primarily based upon the unique
relationship existing between the court and the advocate. The attorney is considered to be a servant of the court. The courts, working through their servants,
strive to further the cause of justice. When the court's servant manifests a want
of fidelity
to this cause, the court has a duty to protect society by disciplining
20

hM.

The goal sought in the exercise of this power is the protection of the courts
of justice from undesirable persons.21 This goal or purpose has its roots firmly
imbedded in our Anglo-American legal history. In addressing the question of the
purpose of these proceedings, the Court in Ex parte Wall quoted Lord Mansfield
as saying,
The question is whether, after the conduct of this man, it is proper that
he should continue a member of a profession which should stand free from
all suspicion. ... It is not by way of punishment; but the courts in such
cases exercise their discretion, whether a man who they have 2formerly
2
admitted is a proper person to be continued on the roll or not.

A somewhat different contention is that disbarment is punishment, notwithstanding
the fact that one of its objectives is the preservation of the courts and the pro-

tection of society. "It would be idle to say that it was not punishment to take
from a man his means of livelihood, and at the same time discredit and disgrace

h i.J)

2 3

As we have seen, a court authorized to admit an attorney to practice has

the inherent jurisdiction 24 to disbar him. Such power has been held to be independent of constitutional or statutory provisions.2 5 In jurisdictions where this power
is regulated by statute,
it is stated that the power would exist even in the absence
26
of such a statute.
Courts are the only authorities considered to possess the power to disbar an

16 Id. at 140-41.
17 345 U.S. 286 (1953).
18 Id. at 289.
19 In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 (1953); Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882); People
v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
20 Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 274 (1882). "We are to see that the officers of the
court are proper persons to be trusted by the court with regard to the interests of suitors ..
Id. at 280.
21 Id. at 288.
22 Id. at 273.
23 Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 93, 176 S.W. 948, 955 (1915).
24 Hertz v. United States, 18 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1927).
25 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 354 (1871).
26 In re Gorsuch, 113 Kan. 380, 214 Pac. 794, 796 (1923).
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attorney. Bar associations do not pqssess and cannot be granted the power to disbar, although they are generally given the power to investigate the charges against
accused attorneys. 27 In In re Bruen28 a state statute giving the board of law examiners the power to hear and determine disbarment actions was held unconstitutional. The court noted that such power was inherently judicial and that the
statute created a judicial tribunal in violation of the Constitution of the state of
Washington. Federal agencies have certain disciplinary powers, however, these are
limited to the particular agency involved and do not affect an attorney's standing
power to
in court. The Commissioner of Patents, for example, is held to have the 29
suspend or disbar an attorney from practicing before that department.
There has been considerable discussion in court opinions concerned with the
nature of these proceedings. The proceeding has been held to. be "in its nature
civil, and collateral to any. criminal prosecution by indictment."30 It has also been
said that such proceedings, although generally classed as civil, "are. nevertheless
of a quasi-criminal nature."3' Courts have argued that the proceeding is "neither
a civil action nor a criminal proceeding, but is a proceeding sui generis .... "832
As is evident from the decisions noted, there is no generally accepted categorization.
The classification of disbarment proceedings is of practical importance because the court's determination of that question will influence its treatment of
the weight of evidence required to impose the penalty. Where, for example, the
proceeding has been held to be civil in nature, it has been said that "cause for
disbarment may be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence .. .and
that proof beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases is not required."33
Only one jurisdiction has been found to require a higher degree of proof than a
mere preponderance,3 4 and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as in criminal cases,
does not appear to have ever been required.3 5
It has generally been held that a statute of limitations is no defense to an action
for disbarment. 38 The benefit of a change of venue is usually allowed in these
proceedings, 7 and the granting of a continuance has been held to be in the discretion of the trial court.38 In most jurisdictions the attorney is allowed the right
to have his cause reviewed. Such a review is governed by the general rules of
appellate practice.39 Generally the disbarred attorney may, in the discretion of
the court, be reinstated and allowed to resume his practice.40 As to the attorney's
right to practice in another jurisdiction after his disbarment, it is generally acwill not admit an attorney to practice if he
cepted that the courts of one state
41
is under the ban of a sister state.

27 In re Royall, 33 N.M. 386, 286 Pac. 570 (1928).
28 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 1152 (1918).
29 Robertson v. United States, 285 Fed. 911, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1922).
30 Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1882).
31 Lenihan v.Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 93, 176 S.W. 948, 954 (1954).
32 In re Bowman, 7 Mo.App. 567 (1879).
33 In re May Berry, 295 Mass. 155, 3 N.E.2d 248, 253 (1936).
34 Copren v. State Bar, 64 Nev. 364, 183 P.2d 833 (1947).
35 State Bar Comm'n v. Sullivan, 35 Okla. 745, 131 Pac. 703 (1913).
36 Wilhelm's Case, 269 Pa. 416, 112 At. 560 (1921). See generally 45 A.L.R. 1111
(1926).
37 Peters v. State Bar of California, 219 Cal. 218, 26 P.2d 19 (1933).
38 Wilhelm's Case, 269 Pa. 416, 112 AtI. 560 (1921).
39 Houtchens v. Mercer, 29 S.W.2d 1031 (Tex. 1930); Lincoln v. Superior Court, 95
Cal. App. 35, 271 Pac. 1107 (1928).
40 In re Smith, 220 Minn. 197, 19 N.W.2d 324 (1945); In re Keenan, 310 Mass. 166,
37 N.E.2d 516 (1941); In re Andreani, 14 Cal.2d 736, 97 P.2d 456 (1939). See generally
70 A.L.R.2d 268 (1960).
41 In re Van Bever, 55 Ariz. 368, 101 P.2d 790 (1940); State Law Examiners v. Brown,
53 Wyo.42, 77 P.2d 626 (1938).
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Analysis of State Legislation
It seems appropriate at this point, in an effort -to show the specific workings of modern. disbarment proceedings, to make a brief analysis of a selected
group of state -procedures.
A number of jurisdictions follow what can be termed an agency type procedure. 42 In such a jurisdiction the court appoints a referee, commissioner, or other
separate agent to conduct the actual disbarment inquiry. Such an "agent" then
recommends action, if deemed necessary, to the court, which alone has the power
to disbar. Pennsylvania, the state in which the Schlesinger case arose, is such a
jurisdiction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has approved of this agency procedure,4 but as we observed in Schlesinger, this same court considered the proceedings in violation of due process of law when the functions of prosecuting and
adjudicating were merged into one body. The statute in Pennsylvania provides for
an agency type hearing; 44 however, the legislature has made no provision regulating
the structure of the body conducting the hearing.45 Schlesinger obviously limits the
bar's power in this regard, in that it requires the separation of the prosecuting
and judicial functions of the investigating committees. 46 The Pennsylvania statute
dealing with disbarment proceedings is not very detailed. It provides for the removal of misbehaving attorneys 47 and goes on to vest the convicted attorney with
the right to have his case reviewed de novo by the state Supreme Court.49 It also
provides that any committee approved by the court may apply to the court to
subpoena witnesses for its investigation. 49 There its regulation ends. All other
procedural safeguards are left to the discretion of the investigating committees, under
the general supervision of the courts.
The Illinois statute, like that of Pennsylvania, may also be deemed unspecific.50
It is so, at least to the extent that it makes no provision to avoid the faulty composition of the hearing body that arose in Schlesinger. The commissioners of the
bar association are empowered to make all of the necessary rules concerning the
"conduct" of disbarment inquiries. 51

Californias legislation differs from that of Pennsylvania and Illinois, in that
it deals with the procedural element in some detail. Two alternative methods are
provided. 52 One gives disciplinary authority to the Board of Governors of the State
Bar, 53 and the other allows for disciplinary action in the Supreme Court of the
state. 54 The Board of Governors may recommend disbarment; only the court may
disbar. The procedural defect in Schlesinger appears to be remedied by the California legislation. The state bar has been authorized by the legislature to provide
42 See, New York, N.Y. JUDIcr~aY LAws § 90; Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.59,
Rule 59 (Smith-Hurd 1941); Ohio, OHrIo REv. CODE ANN., tit. 47, § 4705.02 (Page 1954).
In both Ohio and New York, without specific statutory grants, the courts normally designate
fact-finding "agents" to investigate the charges.
43 Montgomery County Bar Ass'n v. Rifialducci, 329 Pa. 296, 197 At. 924 (1938).
44 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1665 (Supp. 1960).
45 In re Schlesinger, 172 A.2d 835 (Pa. 1961).
46 Id. at 840.
47 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1661 (1953).
48 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1663 (1953).
49 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1665 (Supp. 1960).
50 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.59, Rule 59 (Smith-Hurd 1941). This rule provides
in part as follows:
The board of governors and its existing committee on grievances, and their
successors as such, of the Illinois State Bar Association, and the board of
managers and its existing committee on grievances, and their successors
as such, of the Chicago Bar Association, are hereby appointed as commissioners of this court and are empowered and charged to make investigations. ...
51 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.59, Rule 59 (Smith-Hurd 1941).
52 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6075.
53

54

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6075-87.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6100-18.
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iles of .procedure in these cases,5 5 and has enacted several of the *common law's
traditional procedural safeguards. 6 Rule 26 of the state bar's rules provides in
part that,
When a notice to show cauge is issued the committee issuing such notice
or the committee before which the respondent is directed to appear shall
appoint one or more examiners from the active members of the State Bar
to prepare
not members of the Committee ... it is the duty of 'the examiner
the evidence and present the same to the trial committee. 57

It seems that the examiner is to act as prosecutor. As this rule explicitly separates him from the body which is to hear the charges, it would seem that the
Schlesinger fact situation would not arise under the California bar association's
rules.
A minority of the states do not conduct disbarment actions in the above mentioned agency manner. Rather the attorney's hearing is conducted as in civil cases,
and a jury is provided to determine any disputed facts.
Arkansas, by statute, provides for a trial by jury. The statute reads as follows,
"When the matter charged is not indictable, the trial of the facts alleged shall be
had . . . by jury, or if the accused falls to appear, or, appearing, does not require
a jury, by the court."58s However, it has been stated that where the facts are uncontroverted, the court may direct a verdict on the issues of fact as well as on the
issues of law.s5
Texas provides that, "A jury of twelve men shall be impaneled, unless waived
by the defendant."60 The procedural safeguard of notice is also provided for by
statute.61
Due Process in the Proceedings
The importance of procedural due process was aptly expressed by Mr. Justice
Jackson dissenting in Shaughnessy v. United States.
Procedural fairness, if not all that originally was meant by due process
of law, is at least what it most uncompromisingly requires. Procedural due
process is more elemental and less flexible than substantive due process.
It yields less to the times, varies less with conditions, and defers much less

to legislative judgment. Insofar as it is technical law, it must be a special-

ized responsibility within the competence of the judiciary on which they
do not bend before political branches of the Governement, as they should
on matters of policy which comprise substantive law...
Only the untaught layman or the charlatan lawyer can answer that
procedures matter not. Procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured if they
are fairly and impartially applied. Indeed, if put to the choice, one might
well prefer to live under Soviet substantive law applied in good faith by

our common-law procedures6 2 than under our substantive law enforced by
Soviet procedural practices.

At the outset of this section, a consideration of the validity of the general rationale used by the courts in determining procedural due process in the disbarment
area is relevant. The courts are quite willing to base their determination of what
constitutes due process on the pertinent historical precedents. It is a mistake to regard this tendency as a venture in sophistry. Rather, it seems more correct to view
this inclination as a manifestation of constitutional scholarship. Cardozo, directing
55
56

57

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 6086.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6085.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ch. 4, art. 5, rule 26.

58

ARK. STAT. ANN.,

59
60
61
62

§ 25-411 (1947).
Wernimont v. State, 101 Ark. 210, 142 S.W. 194 (1911).
v.
Civ.
STAT.
art. 316 (1959).
TEx. R
Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. art. 315 (1959).
Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953).
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his attention to an established aspect of criminal procedure, noted that, "Not lightly
vacated is the verdict of quiescent years." 63 Mr. Justice Holmes conveyed the same
thought when he said that,
The Fourteenth Amendment, itself a historical product, did not destroy
history for the States and substitute mechanical compartments 'of law
all exactly alike. If a thing has been practised for two hundred years by
common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment
to affect it.

64

As summary power over members of the bar has been the standard for well over
two hundred years, it is advanced that resort to historical data forms one valid
rationale upon which to resolve issues of due process.
In considering the question of due process, two main points present themselves
for discussion. First, does the guaranty of due process of law, contained in the
fourteenth amendment, apply to proceedings aimed at the revocation of an attorney's
right to practice his profession? Second, if the due process clause applies, what is
necessary to afford the accused attorney such due process?
The answer to question number one is clear; the guaranty of due process embodied in the fourteenth amendment does apply to disbarment proceedings. In
Schlesinger it was stated that, "The right to practice law is constitutionally protected as a property right and no attorney can lawfully be deprived of such right
except by due process of law. .
,, The Supreme Court long ago classified the
practice of law as a property right. In Ex parte Wall the Court said that, "[Ain
attorney's calling or profession is his property, within the true sense and meaning
of the Constitution ...
.,,"6 The more difficult question concerns what is necessary
to afford the accused attorney such due process. In an effort to ascertain what procedural safeguards are required to satisfy the fourteenth amendment, an examination will be made of what various courts have concluded on this point.
It has been held, first of all, that an attorney sought to be disbarred is entitled
to fair notice of the charges against him and a reasonable opportunity to be heard
in his defense.67 There are however, two exceptions to the requirements of notice
and hearing. One exception exists where the matter in question occurs in open
court in the presence of the judge or judges. 6 A second exception presents itself
in the case of an attorney who has been convicted of a crime.6 9 In both of these
cases the court may order the disbarment without affording the accused the procedural safeguards of notice and hearing. In these situations the courts reason that
the evidence before them is sufficient and that further investigation is thus unnecessary.
In Bradley v. Fisher7 0 the Court noted that the power to remove an attorney
from the bar should never be exercised without notice to the attorney of the grounds
of the complaint and ample opportunity for the attorney to be heard. They reasoned
that, "This is a rule of naturaljustice and is applicable to cases where a proceeding
is taken to reach the right of an attorney to practice his profession ....

,,71

Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted that fairness of procedure is "ingrained in our
national traditions and is designed to maintain them."7 2 It is necessary that the
63 Coler v. Corn Exchange Bank, 250 N.Y. 136, 164 N.E. 882, 884 (1928), aff'd, 280
U.S. 218 (1930).
64 Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).
65 In re Schlesinger, 172 A.2d 835, 840 (Pa. 1961).
66 Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 289 (1882).
67 Phipps v. Wilson, 186 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1951).
68 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
69 In re Collins, 188 Cal. 701, 206 Pac. 990 (1922).
70 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
71 Id. at 354 (Emphasis added).
72 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161 (1951) (concurring opinion).
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notice and hearing, generally required in disciplinary actions, must be fair and
reasonable, to satisfy the due process requirement. In Schlesinger the court found
that the hearing violated due process in that the attorney was denied his right to
a fair and impartial hearing. 3 In an attempt ,to convey the requirements of a
reasonable hearing the court noted the statement of the Supreme Court in In re
Murchinson that:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.

Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases.
But our system of law
has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. 74
As previously mentioned, in Schlesinger the duties of prosecutor, judge, and jury
were placed in one body. It was precisely that situation which the court found to
be disagreeable.
The above-noted exception to the due process requirement of notice and an
opportunity to be heard, i.e., that such safeguards are not required where the attorney has been convicted of a crime, requires further elucidation. In the case of
In re Collins78 the California Supreme Court, upon receiving a certified copy of
Collins' conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude, entered an order disbarring him. This action was taken without notice to Collins, and he sought to have
the order set aside contending that the court did not acquire jurisdiction to make
said order and that by making it without notice to him it had deprived him of his
liberty and property without due process of law. The court held that an attorney,
upon his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, is not denied his constitutional rights when he is disbarred without a hearing, the reason being that said
attorney had his day in court when put on trial for the crime."
As we have seen, a majority of the states provide for a referee, commissioner,
or other separate agent to conduct the actual disbarment hearing. There is some
question as to whether due process inheres in such a proceeding. The issue arises
where the attorney is heard before an agency responsible for making determinations
of fact, but is not afforded a hearing before the body making the ultimate ruling
on his right to continue practicing law.
In McVicar v. State Board of Law Examiners7 the accused attorney sought to
enjoin the state board of law examiners from hearing disbarment charges preferred
against him. Plaintiff contended that the relevant statute conferring upon the board
the power to hear issues of fact and certify the same to the Supreme Court of the
state was unconstitutional. The point pressed by the plaintiff was that he was given
notice to appear before the board, whereas the final judgment was to be rendered
by the court. Because he was not given notice to appear before the tribunal having
the power to render judgment, plaintiff claimed he had been denied due process.
The court dismissed plaintiff's bill and disposed of the above contention saying
that such a procedure, "amounts to little else than constituting the board of law
examiners . . . masters of the court to take proof and submit findings thereon, of

the taking of which proof complainant in this case had due and adequate notice."78
An apparently contrary conclusion was reached in In re Noell.79 In this case
an effort was made to disbar Noell, who had previously been disbarred in a state
73 In re Schlesinger, 172 A.2d 835, 840 (Pa. 1961).

74 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
75 In re Collins, 188 Cal. 701, 206 Pac. 990 (1922).
76 For a discussion as to whether conviction is a necessary condition of disbarment proceedings based on charges amounting to a crime, see 90 A.L.R. 1111 (1934), wherein it
is stated that, "In the absence of statutes which are deemed conclusive on the question the
authorities are all agreed that, where the conduct charged as the ground for disbarring an
attorney falls within the sphere of his official duty, the court may proceed summarily against
him without awaiting the result of a criminal prosecution." Id. at 1111.
77 6 F.2d 33 (W.D. Wash. 1925).
78 Id. at 35.

79 93 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1937).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
court, from practice in a federal court. The disbarment was sought under a rule
of the federal court by which any member of the bar of that court who was disbarred in any court of record should have his name stricken from the roll of the
federal court. Noell asserted that the order of the state court was entered without
notice and without giving him an opportunity to be heard and was therefore lacking
in due process of law. The procedure used in the state court was similar to that
used in McVicar. The court appointed a commissioner to hear the cause and report
finding of fact. 'The commissioer, in his report to the court, recommended suspension to which Noell took exception. Without affording the accused notice or
hearing, the state court denied his exceptions and entered the disbarment order.
The federal court'concluded that the hearings before the commissioner were not
hearings before the court. Hence, the court did not have the merits of the cause
before it until the report of the commissioner and the exceptions of the respondent
were filed with it. The court at no time afforded Noell an opportunity to be heard
before it upon the merits, and by this inaction it was held that respondent had
been deprived of due process of law.
One further point deserves mention concerning agency-conducted disciplinary
proceedings, namely, the composition of the agency conducting the hearing. As we
have seen in Schlesinger, the agency conducting the hearing must be completely
impartial. Therefore, where the functions of prosecutor, judge, and jury are given
to one body, the hearing may be deemed partial and thus, unfair. Because of the
agency's composition, the court in Schlesinger held -that the attorney had been denied due process of law. The court in McVicar seems to have overlooked the implications of the agency's composition. McVicar held that a state statute was not
invalid because it authorized a member of the Board of Law Examiners, which
heard the evidence, to prefer charges against an attorney and then to sit as a member
of the board for consideration of these charges. The court noted that such a procedure "raises no presumption of unfairness in the proceedings, and in no wise
invalidates the statute .... 80

The accused in a disbarment proceeding has no constitutional right to a trial
by jury. 8' However, as we have seen, a minority of jurisdictions provide him with2
such a hearing. The Supreme Court addressed itself to this point in Ex parte Wall.
Wall was accused of engaging in a riot in which a prisoner was taken and lynched
before the court house door. Wall's summary disbarment was upheld by the Court.
As to Wall's plea for a jury trial the Court said, "It is a mistaken idea that due
process of law requires . . . a trial by jury, in all cases where property or personal

rights are involved."8' 3 Continuing, the Court noted that "In all cases, that kind of
procedure is due process of law which is suitable and proper to the nature of the
case and sanctioned by the established customs and usages of the courts."8 4 The
Court seemingly based its denial of a jury trial to Wall on that ground. Historically,
disbarment proceedings have been summary and "established customs and usages
of the courts" bring summary procedure and the denial of trial by jury within the
confines of due process.
An unusual issue concerning trial by jury arose in the case of State Board of
Law Examiners v. Phelan.85 The constitutionality of a statute allowing for trial by
jury in disbarment actions was questioned. It was contended by the State
Examiners that a statute providing for trial by jury in disbarment cases was an
unconstitutional interference with the inherent power of the courts over its officers.
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MeVicar v. State Board of Law Examiners, 6 F.2d 33, 35-36 (W.D. Wash. 1925).
Montgomery County Bar Ass'n v. Rinalducci, 329 Pa. 296, 197 At. 924 (1938).
107 U.S. 265, 289 (1882).
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NOTES
The court held that since the statute was not an unreasonable regulation of the
court's power, it was not unconsitutional.
After noting that an attorney cannot be deprived of his profession without due
process of law, which, as we have seen, includes notice and an opportunity to be
heard, the court in Montgomery County Bar Ass'n v. Rinalduccis. said the following concerning trial by jury: "[T]he Federal Constitution [does] not guarantee to
an attorney the right of trial by jury in disbarment or disciplinary cases. The power
to discipline its officers inheres in the court itself."'' 7 This conclusion of the court,
as is the case with similar conclusions that we have noted in this section, seems to
be based on the historical competence of the courts in this field.
Generally, in disbarment actions, the ordinary rules of evidence apply. In
People v. Amos 8 it was said, "that the recognized rules of evidence should be observed in this class of cases as well as in all others." 8 9 However, a recent decision
hints that due process may not be offended by a refusal to allow the attorney the
right to take depositions. 90
There is conflict on the question of whether an attorney in a disbarment proceeding has the right to confront the witnesses testifying against him. It has been
held that an attorney in such a proceeding has no right of confrontation. 91 Decisions to the contrary indicate that the accused attorney is entitled to confront the
accusing witnesses and subject them to cross-examination.9 2 In Schlesinger it was
stated that:
The appellant has a constitutional right to the production of the reports
of the witnesses against him, touching the events and activities to which
they testified,
and to inspect so much of such reports as is relevant to
93
the issue.
To further emphasize the procedural exceptions allowed in these'proceedings,
it is valuable to refer back to Cohen v. Hurley 4 wherein the Court held that an
attorney in a disbarment hearing cannot complain that the proceedings were unconstitutional as a result of his being denied the use of his privilege against self-

incrimination.
In our brief examination we have seen that state courts have varied opinions in
regard to the procedures required to satisfy due process of law in this area. Procedural safeguards as traditional as trial by jury, and confrontation and cross-ex-

amination of witnesses, are allowed by some courts and denied by others. It seems
fair to conclude that the only universal procedural requirements set down by the
courts are those of notice and the opportunity to be heard. However, we have noted
exceptions to even these basic elements of procedural due process of law.
Conclusion
Two opposing policy positions seem to present themselves from the foregoing
analysis. The prevailing side contends that the summary procedures applied in
this area satisfy the conditions of due process of law. As we have seen, they base

this contention on historical precedent. The other group argues that these summary
procedures violate due process of law. They seem to reject historical precedent.
Mr. Justice Black, a spokesman for this minority position, stated the following in
his dissent in Cohen:
The majority is holding, however, that lawyers are not entitled to the
full sweep of due process protections because they had no such protection
86 329 Pa. 296, 197 At]. 924 (1938).
87 Id. at 926.
88 246 Ill. 299, 92 N.E. 857 (1910).
89 Id. at 859.
90 In re Crow, 181 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
91 Bar Ass'n of San Diego v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 64 Cal. App. 590,
222 Pac. 185 (1923).
92 Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 93, 176 S.W. 948 (1915).
93 In re Schlesinger, 172 A.2d 835, 848 (Pa. 1961).
94 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
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against judges or their fellow lawyers in England. But I see no reason why
this generation of Americans should be deprived of a part of its Bill of
Rights on the basis of medieval English practices that our Forefathers
left England, fought a revolution and wrote a Constitution to get- rid of.95

While not intending to compare Schlesinger and Cohen on their facts, it is
submitted here that the policy position, as expressed by the majority in Cohen, is
the better one. The present procedures, albeit summary in nature, appear to afford

an adequate degree of fairness to the accused attorney. Until stronger arguments
can be offered against the current mode of procedure, the verdict of the "quiescent
years" should stand. In addressing the issue of the courts' power in this area,
Justice Cardozo compellingly concluded as follows:
In the long run the power now conceded will make for the health and
honor of the profession and for the protection of the public. If the house
is to be cleaned, it is for those who occupy and govern it, rather than for
strangers, to do the noisome work.9 6
Frank P. Maggio
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